CHINA'S ACADEMIC RELATIONS WITH CANADA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

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This three-part paper focuses on the past experience, present state and future direction of academic exchanges between China and Canada.[1] It first examines the history of their academic relationship between 1970 and 1989, providing both an overview and an assessment of a broad range of exchange activities between the two countries. It then describes and analyzes the state of and Chinese and Canadian perspectives on their academic relations since June 1989. Looking to the future, the paper identifies a number of factors relevant to the reshaping of Canada-China academic exchanges and then proposes a new model for their academic cooperation in the 21st century.

The Past

Academic contacts between Canada and China date back to the late 19th century. During the first half of the 20th century several generations of Canadian missionaries established themselves in central and south China. Among other activities they operated what were probably the first Canadian schools in China, staffed

in part by Canadian teachers.[2] It appears that contacts between Chinese and Canadian universities during this period were informal at best and resulted from the personal initiatives of Chinese who enrolled in a handful of Canadian universities and of a small number of Canadian academics who visited China. This early academic relationship was inhibited by the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and by the Civil War (1946-49) which followed. The proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 signalled the departure of Canadian missionaries from China and the suspension of most academic contacts between Chinese and Canadians. A resumption of informal academic contacts in the early 1960s[3] was interrupted by the launching of the Cultural Revolution in China in 1966.

It was only after the establishment of formal diplomatic ties between China and Canada in 1970 that their "academic relations" began to develop the current shape. In this process, Chinese and Canadian academics were frequently motivated by their sense of a "special relationship" between the two countries. To the Chinese Canada was the home of Dr. Norman Bethune, a western country without a record of "imperialist" aggression in China, the first western government to recognize the legitimacy of the communist government and a window on the heretofore inaccesible high-tech world of North America. To Canadians, China was an exotic, faraway country with a rich cultural history and extraordinary development needs, which was linked to Canada's missionary past and to its economic destiny in the Pacific Rim and which held

Canadians in astoninglishly high regard because of the activities of a Montreal physican in China in the 1930s. The result was a remarkable tendency to try to work together to resolve differences and to minimize potential conflicts.

The two decades from 1970 to 1989 witnessed what can only be described as a spectactular proliferation of academic exchanges between the two countries in three distinct stages. Phase One (1970-1979) was characterized by a small official student exchange program which emphasized non-degree language study; by a somewhat irregular but official professorial exchange program; and by the exchange of a limited number of specialized academic delegations for familiarization and "friendship" visits. Phase Two (1979-1983) dates from the conclusion of a much broader China/Canada academic exchange agreement in June 1979 and was characterized by a widening range and increasing volume of exchange activities. These included an official program to send Chinese visiting scholars to Canada for non-degree advanced study and research; the enrollment of some younger Chinese students in graduate degree programs at Canadian universities; travel to China by an increasing number of Canadian professors, mostly to lecture in their areas of specialization; and particularly the conclusion of a number of linkage agreements twinning Canadian and Chinese universities. Phase Three (1983-89) was characterized by a dramatic increase in the level of China/Canada academic exchange activity (particularly the training of Chinese graduate students in Canada) and the further proliferation of institutional linkages, resulting primarily in response to the

increasing availability of Canadian and international development assistance monies for China.[4]

Chinese Academics in Canada

It appears that as many as 10,000 Chinese academics came to Canada for study and/or research at Canadian universities during the period from 1970 to 1989.[5] From 1973 to 1979 the predominant group of Chinese academics in Canada were "special students" who came to Canada for undergraduate non-degree language training. From 1979 to 1984 the largest number came as official "visiting scholars" - typically mid-career professors or researchers specializing in engineering or science - for one or two years of Chinese-government supported non-degree advanced study or research under the supervision of individual Canadian professors in their fields. Beginning with the 1984/85 academic year the number of visiting scholars declined, but they were replaced by a larger number of younger Chinese graduate students who enrolled in Canadian degree programs. While statistics vary, it is clear that the number of Chinese graduate students in Canadian universities increased from fewer than 100 in 1980 to more than 3,000 by 1989; and that by 1986 China had displaced the United States as the single largest source of international graduate students in Canada.[6]

The professional experiences of Chinese academics in Canada appear to have improved considerably during the past two decades. In the early years some special students and visiting scholars from China were unhappy with their non-degree status and tried to

transfer into degree programs. Many visiting scholars expressed dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the centralized placement procedures that were in use. Others encountered difficulties working with their assigned faculty supervisors. Similarly, Canadian professors frequently complained about the uneven language competence, inadequate professional preparation and vague research projects of some visiting scholars. Thus, both the Canadian and Chinese sides seemed to welcome the shift from visiting scholars to graduate students in the mid-1980s. In general, Chinese academics preferred to apply directly to institutions of their own choosing; to enroll in degree programs rather than engage in non-degree study; and to compete for financial assistance (including fellowships and assitantships) for which visiting scholars had been ineligible. Canadian university administrators and faculty supervisors also much preferred graduate students who were subject to regular graduate admissions procedures (including TOEFL requirements); enrolled initially in graduate seminars rather than tutorials; engaged in advanced study or research where their performance could be measured against that of other students; and either paid tuition or were eligible for financial assistance.[7] In general, Chinese graduate students enrolled in Canadian degree programs - particularly in engineering, the sciences, medicine and management - appear to have performed remarkably well, reflecting language and professional competence far superior to that of the visiting scholars who preceeded them.[8] Upon their return to China, the experiences of Canadian-trained Chinese academics

appear to have varied considerably, depending in part on their individual personalities and on the environment at their home institutions. Some returned scholars and students were promoted, assigned important administrative duties, given access to research monies and travel opportunities and expected to play a role in the development of further academic relations with universities in western countries; while others were ignored and even discriminated against because of their overseas experience! While some returnees were still in contact with their Canadian teachers and fellow students, many felt cut off from their host Canadian institutions.[9]

The non-professional experiences of Chinese academics in Canada were generally less satisfactory. In the first decade of exchanges some special students and visiting scholars were able to use their time in Canada to make Canadian friends, to become more familiar with Canadian culture and even to travel within Canada. Many others remained socially isolated from Canadians by the poor quality of their spoken English or French; by the pressures of their academic work; and by their unfamiliarity with western social customs. These problems were often exacerbated by their choice of housing in Canada: those who chose to live in off-campus housing with other Chinese visitors, were able to save money and create a homey environment, but they tended to lose out on the socialization that apparently went with residence in university housing or with taking a room in a Canadian home. The monetary difficulties faced by Chinese government-supported visiting scholars also inhibited their participation in

socialization activities and their ability to travel within Canada. Finally, visiting scholars were typically married and two years of separation from their spouses (and in many cases young children) appears to have motivated many to work hard in Canada and to return to China as quickly as possible.[10] The phasing out of the special students and visiting scholars programs and the arrival of large numbers of graduate students appears to have dramatically changed the social experience of most Chinese academics. Graduate students tended to be younger and less mature. Their period of study in Canada was much longer, stretching at times to three years for masters students or four to five years for doctoral students. Their financial position, however difficult by Canadian standards, was much improved, particularly in the case of traineees funded by Canadian government agencies. Many were able to bring their spouses from China for visits. Some spouses remained in Canada and began families here. The commitment of some of these young people to return to China as soon as possible was inevitably tempered by their Canadianization. In some cases students prolonged their stay in Canada at the urging of their parents or their home institutions in China. The non-return of Canadian-trained Chinese students to China was already a concern to both Chinese and Canadian authorities by the 1987/88 academic year.[11]

Canadian Academics in China

Several thousand Canadian professors visited China for academic purposes between 1970 and 1989.[12] It appears that in most cases

these visits were motivated by their intellectual curiosity, sense of professional responsibility, institutional loyalty, professional opportunity and/or personal background.[13] In the years prior to 1979 most Canadian professors who visited China stayed only briefly and traveled as members of large thematic delegations engaged in familiarization tours of selected Chinese institutions in selected Chinese cities. Canadian academic delegations continued to visit China in the 1980s, but they gradually became more focused - either on a specific discipline or on the mission of a specific Canadian institution. In addition, in the early 1980s a significant number of Canadian professors began to visit China on an individual basis, typically at the invitation of particular Chinese institutions that were familiar with their work, either through reports from returned visiting scholars or from scholarly literature that was becoming increasingly available on Chinese campuses. Other Canadians traveled to China in smaller numbers as language teachers or researchers.[14] By the mid-1980s the proliferation of institutional linkages between Canadian and Chinese universities was bringing an increasing number of Canadian professors to China, some for second or third visits, to teach intensive graduate courses and/or co-supervise the research of advanced Chinese students, within the framework of programs of institutional cooperation.

The professional experiences of Canadian professors in China between 1970 and 1989 appear to have varied considerably, depending on the purpose of the visit, their personalities and

those of their hosts and the political climate in China and in their host institutions. In the early 1980s visiting lecturers (particularly in engineering and the sciences) and language teachers frequently complained of heavy work schedules, but also remarked on their rewarding or even "exhilarating" pedagogical experiences. Delegation members typically described their tours as "exhausting" but worthwhile. Visiting researchers in the social sciences, on the other hand, were often frustrated by the lack of access to archival materials and the limitations on field research.[15] As the decade wore on a number of Canadian academics, particularly those in engineering, the sciences and management who were in China to teach graduate courses, also began to develop collaborative research projects with their Chinese colleagues. When funding was secured for such projects they became useful vehicles for the joint training of graduate students. On the other hand, the limited availability of collaborative research funding soon became a source of frustration to an increasing number of Canadian academics.[16]

The social experiences of most Canadian academics who visited China, particularly for short periods, were initially quite limited. Canadian academic delegations were typically housed in tourist hotels off-campus and spent only a day or two visiting any one Chinese university or research institute; except for a formal banquet there was little opportunity to socialize with their Chinese hosts. In the early and mid-1980s most visiting lecturers were also housed in off-campus hotels; while

comfortable, they encouraged socialization with other foreign visitors rather than with Chinese academics.[17] Of course, as personal and institutional relations developed, as returned visiting scholars hosted visits from former Canadian faculty supervisors, and as Chinese institutions began to build on-campus guest houses for foreign professors, the social experiences of Canadian academic visitors to China improved.[18]

Academic Linkages

The development of institutional linkages between Chinese and Canadian universities was a natural outcome of the academic familiarization process which has been described above. Prior to 1979 there was only one formalized linkage between Chinese and Canadian universities.[19] Such linkages were encouraged by the June 1979 academic exchange agreement between the two countries. By 1984 Chinese and Canadian institutions had formalized 45 linkages (involving twenty-one Canadian universities) and eight other linkages were under discussion.[20] By 1989 forty-three linkages between Canadian and Chinese universities were receiving substantial external funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).[21]

Linkage agreements between Chinese and Canadian universities varied considerably. They typically provided for the exchange of professors "as resources permitted," with the home country of each visitor paying the cost of international airfare and the host country paying for in-country expenses after arrival. Most also called for the exchange of scientific material and some made

provision for student exchanges. Some were open-ended, others required periodic renewal. Some focused on specific areas of mutual academic interest, others left such matters to be decided later. Some committed the signatories to specific start-up academic exchange activities, most did not. Most agreements were signed by the presidents or vice-presidents of the universities involved in well-publicized ceremonies that spoke of contributing to "friendship" between the Chinese and Canadian people.[22]

What motivated Chinese universities to push for the signing of linkage agreements with Canadian universities after 1979? From the Chinese perspective, such linkage agreements were tangible proof that their institutions were supporting the new national policy of building socialism through technology transfer from the west. Linkages with universities abroad also allowed Chinese universities to contribute to the realization of the international investment and technology transfer strategy of their provinces or cities. In addition, they enhanced the stature of Chinese institutions by confirming their international reputation. International linkages were expected to help Chinese universities to more rapidly develop their teaching and research potential in priority areas of science and technology. They positioned Chinese institutions to seek additional Chinese government funding (and later international development funding) to underwrite the costs associated with international exchanges. Finally, linkage agreements undoubtedly facilitated official procedures for sending Chinese professors and students abroad and

for receiving Canadian professors in China.[23]

Many Canadian universities were at first reluctant to sign linkage agreements with Chinese institutions. Few Canadian institutions were well organized for international development activities in 1979 and even the umbrella Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) had only established an International Development Office (IDO) in 1978.[24] Under the circumstances those Canadian universities which moved first appear to have been spurred on by the presence on their campus of high-ranking Chinese academics;[25] or by the timely presence in China of respected Canadian faculty members who were approached directly about formal cooperation.[26] A few Canadian universities were encouraged by provincial government initiatives.[27] Perhaps the biggest push for linkages came from an IDO conference on "Canadian Universities and China" which was convened at the University of Regina in April 1982. This conference provided the first opportunity for Canadian universities to share information about their China initiatives; and to learn about CIDA's new commitment to development assistance for China.[28] In the years that followed, competition among Canadian universities, a push to internationalize, the prospect of external funding for linkages with Chinese universities and fear of being left out undoubtedly encouraged other Canadian universities to join the linkage bandwagon. Between 1983 and 1989 institutional linkages - a significant proportion of which did receive external funding - gradually became the framework within which a substantial part of Canada/China academic exchange activity - particularly at the

faculty level - was to occur.

Prior to 1989 it had already become clear that some linkages between Chinese and Canadian universities were more effective than others; and that a few linkages were completely ineffective. It appears that among the relevant factors in determining which linkages worked were: sustained commitment by key university administrators on both sides; the existence of a core of professors at both the Chinese and Canadian universities who were committed to the project; a clear sense of mutual benefit; the probability of external funding; the promise of meaningful collaborative research; and, a commitment to sustain the linkage even if external funding was not immediately available.[29]

External Funding

In the 1970s and early 1980s the most serious challenge facing advocates of stepped-up academic exchanges between China and Canada was how to finance such exchanges. On the Canadian side, there was little federal money available during the 1970s. The official Canada/China Student Exchange (which began in 1973) and Canada/China Professorial Exchange (which began in 1974) were critical initiatives of the Department of External Affairs at an early stage in Canada/China academic relations, but they were inadequate for the needs of an expanding exchange program. The official Visiting Scholars Program (which began in 1979) was administered by the Council of Ministers of Education of Canada (CMEC), was geared to the needs of mid-career non-degree Chinese

academic visitors and could not be used to finance the academic linkages envisaged in the expanded academic exchange agreement concluded in 1979. The academic exchange agreement between the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) which began in 1981 was tailored to the needs of an important but narrowly defined group of academics. Thus, from the beginning of Canada/China exchanges in the 1970s and particularly after 1979, pressure was brought to bear on the Canadian government to help finance a much broader range of academic exchange activities with China. The federal response was the initiation of substantial China programs by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). For the 1988/89 academic year alone, the total disbursements of these two agencies for China totaled $50.31 million, ranking Canada third among bilateral donors (after Japan and Australia) to development assistance for China.[30] A significant proportion of this money was used to promote development work involving Canadian universities and colleges. The involvement of these two international development agencies in academic exchanges between China and Canada had a dramatic impact on Canada/China academic exchange activities prior to 1989.

IDRC, established in 1970 and based in Ottawa, is mandated

> ...to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the problems of the developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting scientific, technical and other knowledge to the economic and social advancement of those regions..."[31]

IDRC's China program began in 1980. Working with the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) of China, it has supported research activities in the areas of agriculture, food and nutrition sciences, health sciences, information sciences and social sciences. By mid-1984 IDRC was already funding twenty research projects in China, many of which involved individual Canadian academics and eight of which involved Canadian universities and other research institutions. IDRC's China expenditures have averaged above $2 million annually during most of the 1980s[32] and reached $3.79 million during the 1988/89 academic year.[33]

CIDA's China programs began in 1983 in cooperation with China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MFERT). The focus of its activities is primarily on human resource development, on "...building human and institutional linkages between Chinese and Canadians, strengthening institutions, and maximizing potential multiplier effects in areas where Canada has strong capabilities."[34] CIDA programs initially focused on the areas of human resource development, agriculture, forestry and energy and after 1986 included the areas of transportation and telecommunications.[35] The CIDA financial commitment to China was initially established at $80 million for the period 1982-87 and was subsequently inceased to $200 million for the period beginning in 1987.[36] Annual China expenditures increased from $2.59 million in 1982/83 to $38.71 million in 1988/89.[37]

The focal point of Canadian university and college participation in CIDA China projects has been the human resource development sector. It quickly became apparent that predominant vehicle for CIDA-funded human resource development projects in China would be the institutional linkage. When CIDA's China program began, its China Desk assumed responsibility for the overall management of these academic linkages, but beginning in 1987 began moving to create umbrella agreements with intermediary organizations. By 1989 there were at least forty-five academic linkages being funded by CIDA, most of which were administratively contained within three umbrella projects. The Canada-China Management Education Program (a total $38.4 million over two phases, extending from 1983-1994) aimed to strengthen management education programs at key Chinese universities and linked eight Chinese and ten Canadian universities in its initial phase and an additional twenty-four Chinese institutions on each side during its second phase under the auspices of the Canadian Federation of Deans of Management and Administrative Studies. The Canada-China University Linkage program ($14.85 million over the period 1988-95) was designed to provide modest grants to 31 China/Canada university and hospital linkages (in three cycles) with emphasis on training of graduate and post-graduate students under the auspices of AUCC; by 1989 twenty-one CCULP linkages had been funded and AUCC had also been asked to manage 14 previously approved ICDS and four bilateral projects outside the CCULP program. The Canada-China Language and Cultural Programme ($11.6 million over the period 1990 to 1993) had been operational since 1983 and included a language school in Beijing (in cooperation

with Beijing Normal University) and a network of regional orientation centres in Canada under the direction of St. Mary's University. A Canada/China College Linkage Program was also planned but was not yet operational in 1989.[38]

What was the impact on Canadian universities of having significant external (particularly CIDA) funding available for academic exchange projects with China? Clearly, external funding played a critical role in encouraging Canadian universities to develop more academic linkages with China, with positive impact on China's human and institutional resources. On the other hand, it is also true that CIDA funding significantly influenced the size, duration and focus of many linkage projects. CIDA's commitment to human resource development led Canadian and Chinese universities to emphasize the training of graduate students over the short term, rather than collaborative research among professors (not a CIDA-fundable activity) which would normally sustain academic linkages over a longer term. CIDA application procedures for linkage funding required the development of new kinds of expertise and the expenditure of considerable time and money to develop full-blown proposals which, in some cases, stood little chance of being funded. This, in turn, led to considerable frustration on some Chinese and Canadian campuses and to competition rather than cooperation among Canadian universities. Finally, the decision to allow the International Division of AUCC to serve as a CIDA executing agency, served to undermine two of AUCC's important international functions: its

role as "China liaison office" serving the information needs of all Canadian universities interested in China; and its role as voice of the Canadian university community in dealings with such Canadian government agencies as CIDA.[39]

Report Card

On the eve of the Tiananmen Incident Canada/China academic exchanges appeared to be "promising," "successful," "upbeat" and "headed in the right direction."[40] On the other hand, with the benefit of hindsight it is possible to identify six problems which were already present before June 1989. First, there was already a problem with young Chinese graduate students wishing to prolong their stay in Canada beyond receipt of their intended degree. Second, Some Canadian alumni among returned students and scholars in China were experiencing professional and personal reintegration difficulties and felt cut off from their Canadian alma mater. Third, there had already been some fall-off in Canadian faculty interest in China among those academics who were less interested in training graduate students and more interested in collaborative research. Fourth, linkage programs with China were being shaped to fit CIDA's requirements, rather than the unique development needs and opportunities of individual Chinese institutions. Fifth, those linkages which were unsuccessful in their bid for CIDA funding had few funding alternatives available to them - for example, a competitive scholarship program for which only graduate students from China who were not in CIDA-funded linkages would be eligible. Finally, the gathering and dissemination of information about Canadian universities and

China had been allowed to lapse, with the result that most Canadian universities were poorly informed about the experiences and objectives of other Canadian universities in China.

The Present

The tragic events of June 4 in Tiananmen Square have had a very dramatic impact on Chinese academic relations with Canada. The reaction of the Government of Canada and the counter-reaction of the Government of China created a crisis that has already undermined and threatens to destroy the "special relationship" that has been at the heart of two decades of academic cooperation.

The China story was front-page news in major newspapers across Canada, as elsewhere in the world, in May and June 1989. In late May Chinese Canadians organized rallies in major Canadian cities to demonstrate their support for the Beijing students and to urge a non-violent end to the confrontation with the Chinese government. Chinese scholars and students in Canada openly participated in many of these rallies[41] In the aftermath of the widely televized June 4 violence in Beijing, emotional protest marches were staged across Canada. The largest march occurred in Toronto, where 30,000 Chinese Canadians (accompanied by many Chinese students) marched on the Chinese consulate.[42] Canadian newspapers quickly focused on the plight of Chinese students in Canada, on the alleged harassment of their relatives back in China and on fears for the students' safety if they returned to

China.[43] These stories were complemented by others which graphically described the difficulties encountered by Canadians caught in China.[44] The overall impact on Canadian public opinion toward the Chinese government was devastating.

The Canadian Government and China

The Canadian government responded swiftly and critically to events in Beijing. On June 4 External Affairs Minister Joe Clark demanded that China end "the aggressive and senseless killing by its armed forces" which "...can only shock and offend all Canadians."[45] On June 5 he advised Canadians to leave Beijing immediately, made preparations to evacuate Canadian citizens to nearby Asian cities and presented Canada's Parliament with a resolution condemning the "excessive and indiscriminate" violence that had occurred in a "tragedy of global proportions." He also assured Chinese students in Canada that Canada would "respond sympathetically" to requests to remain here during the upheaval.[46] The next day he announced the postponement of five CIDA projects which were about to be signed and the review of several other aspects of Canada's policy toward China.[47] Prime Minister Brian Mulroney described the students in Beijing as "young heroes" and urged them "Do not despair...Victory must eventually be yours because liberty can never be denied."[48] On June 12 Canada announced that it was recalling Ambassador Earl Drake from Beijing as a further indication of "...disapproval of the activities of authorities in China"[49] and several days later summoned Chinese Ambassador Zhang Wenpu to the Department of

External Affairs to reiterate Canada's protest about the "brutal police-state tactics" being used against student activists in China.[50]

While persisting in its public condemnation of Chinese government actions against its students, the Canadian government was also moving during the month of June to redefine its post-Tiananmen China policy in light of an "extensive consultative process." Of particular note was a "National Round Table" which was convened in late June to bring together Canadian academics, industrialists, the Chinese Canadian community and non-governmental organizations. On June 30 Joe Clark announced a number of unilateral "adjustments" to Canada/China relations, emphasizing that China's opinion notwithstanding, relations between Canada and China were not going to be conducted on the basis of "business as usual" and that "like-minded" countries should coordinate their approach to China for maximum impact. Clark indicated that Canadian policy in China would emphasize preserving existing academic and other links; focus on "people-to-people" exchanges; and avoid giving support to the political and/or military hardliners. More specifically, he announced that "for the time being" Canada would continue to refuse high-level contacts with China; focus more on human rights there; withdraw from some CIDA-sponsored China programs and suspend some others; cut down on the promotion of Canada/China trade; and facilitate Canadian immigration, particularly for Chinese students and their families.[51]

The Clark announcement signalled the beginning of Canadian efforts to resume CIDA programming in China within the parameters outlined on June 30. All CIDA activities in China had been put "on hold" in early June in the wake of Tiananmen. CIDA-funded Canadians in China had been evacuated from June 4-15 and no new Chinese students or scholars had been sent to Canada during that period.[52] CIDA-sponsored Chinese trainees whose stay in Canada had been scheduled to end during the summer of 1989 had received a blanket extension of CIDA funding for up to three months. The China desk at CIDA anticipated in early July that the resumption of activities would run into difficulties because of changes in Chinese exit regulations, possible shifts in Chinese personnel and the disruptions of previous months. It urged Canadian executing agencies (CEAs) to "do what you can," but also restricted their start-up activities. CEAs were asked to revise their "workplans" to take into account the impact of the situation in China and, in particular, the extent and impact of non-returning students on their individual projects. One can clearly sense in CIDA documentation in early July a tension between Canada's special immigration procedures for Chinese students and CIDA's development objectives which required that "...Whenever possible we hope that they will decide to return to China."[53] This point also emerged at a July 14 meeting of CEAs for CIDA's China programs, at which it was made clear that CIDA "...should not be in the business of training better immigrants" and that therefore once Chinese students received permanent resident status they should lose their CIDA support.[54]

In fact, during the 1989/90 academic year most CIDA-funded Canada/China linkage programs - including the umbrella CCULP and CCMEP - had to be "adjusted" to the new academic exchange realities: many CIDA-funded Chinese students in Canada who had been expected to return to China and strengthen Chinese graduate education in fields of highest priority, were instead opting to stay in Canada; at the same time, the Chinese government was insisting on shifting the emphasis of CIDA-funded linkage programs to in-China graduate training for Chinese trainees; as a result, in most revised linkages more Canadian faculty were expected to visit China (despite declining Canadian faculty interest in China at some universities); and more mid-career visiting scholars from China were expected to come to Canada for shorter periods of non-degree study and research.[55]

Despite the approval of a third cycle of ten CCULP linkages, recommendations from both Chinese and Canadian participants that there should be a CCULP Phase II[56] and an October 1990 end to the destabilizing special immigration procedures for Chinese students,[57] CIDA's China programming is clearly entering a new phase. The recent decision of the CIDA China desk to undertake an extensive review of its human resource development strategy for China - and in particular the predominant linkage format - reflects a growing CIDA concern that, in a time of shrinking Canadian development resources, increasing demands and a changing political reality in China, a program of unfocused institutional linkages may not be the most effective method to further human and institutional development in China.[58]

Chinese Students in Canada

A major concern of the Canadian government in the days after June 4 was how best to deal with the nearly 5000 Chinese students and scholars who were already studying in Canada. It appears that the government was operating on the assumption that "...most PRC students had justifiable fears about their safety, were they to return to China, and would therefore be staying in Canada in either the short or long term."[59] On June 5 Joe Clark had assured the students that Canada would "respond sympathetically" to requests to remain here for the duration of the upheaval in China;[60] and on the same day Barbara McDougall, federal Minister of Employment and Immigration, had extended all expiring visas of Chinese nationals in Canada for 60 days (subsequently extended to one year).[61] On June 16 McDougall issued a more comprehensive statement in which she assured all Chinese visitors that "...they need have no fear that they will be asked to leave Canada as long as the situation in China remains threatening for them." She outlined four options for Chinese students "...who do not wish to return to China": to retain their student status which would be extended as necessary; to apply for permanent residence in Canada on "compassionate" or "humanitarian" grounds; to apply for an immigrant visa from outside Canada; or to claim refugee status. She emphasized that Chinese students were "...not under the obligation to make an immediate and possibly irrevocable choice regarding their future" and also indicated that Chinese students in Canada who had lost their financial assistance from the Chinese government could apply for work permits. Finally, she

promised to expedite the visa applications of relatives of Chinese Canadians and Chinese students in Canada.[62] At a meeting jointly organized by CIDA and the Department of External Affairs on the same day, and attended by representatives of federal and provincial government agencies, non-governmental organizations and the Chinese Canadian community, it was agreed that Chinese students in Canada needed to be provided with information and financial assistance on an emergency basis; and that the Canadian Bureau for International Education (CBIE), working in cooperation with the Chinese Canadian National Council (CCNC), would be an appropriate agency to coordinate that task.[63] On June 30 Clark and Monique Landry, the Minister for External Relations and International Trade, announced the creation of the National Emergency Support for Chinese Students Program (NESCSP) to be coordinated by CBIE in cooperation with CCNC.[64]

The Chinese Student Secretariat (as NESCSP soon came to be known) began operation on June 22, 1989 and continued until March 31, 1990. The Secretariat was based in Ottawa and served as national manager of the program; in addition, it subcontracted CCNC to provide regional services in Vancouver, Edmonton, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal.[65] It appears to have operated on a budget of between $1.1 and $1.5 million, of which $300,000 was earmarked for emergency financial assistance for Chinese students.[66] The many activities of the Secretariat can best be described in six broad categories. A key task was to produce and distribute information packages which would assist those counselling Chinese students; more than 1100 copies of each of six packages were

delivered by courier to "an exhaustive mailing list." Another major task of the Secretariat was counselling and referral of Chinese students across Canada which was accomplished by means of 24 hour toll-free hotlines which were established at both the national office and the five regional centres; by late December 1989 the project had received more than 12,000 telephone calls from Chinese students and counsellors, with 66.6% of the calls dealing with immigration questions. The Secretariat was also responsible for on-going liaison activities with governmental and non-governmental organizations; for mobilization of community resources (including the creation of more than twenty "local action committees" of volunteers); for the provision of emergency financial assistance; and for media relations.[67] The result of all this activity was that by January 1990 nearly 8,000 Chinese nationals in Canada (out of a pool of 9,700, including nearly 5,000 students) had applied for "permanent resident" status in Canada and in nearly 7,200 cases permanent resident status had already been granted "on humanitarian and compassionate grounds"; only 168 applications had been rejected.[68] By the time that the special immigration procedures for Chinese students in Canada were rescinded in October 1990, it appeared that the overwhelming majority of Chinese students who had been in Canada just prior to June 4, 1989 had applied for and then been granted "permanent resident" status.[69] In its final report to CIDA, the Secretariat observed that Canada had distinguished itself from other western host countries which had been more "... cautious with immigration policy and financial assistance for PRC students" and had relied instead on "visa extensions" as a response to Chinese

students' fears of returning to China. The report concluded that:

> ...Canada can be proud of herself in her assistance of Chinese students since she has offered the most comprehensive program in the developed world in support of Chinese students affected by the tragedy of June 4...[70]

It could also be argued to the contrary that Canada's post-Tiananmen policy towards its Chinese students was ill-advised; and that it has done more to undermine academic relations between the two countries than any event except the Tiananmen tragedy itself. It simultaneously squandered a major Canadian investment in China's international development; further weakened the political position of those reformers in China who had favored sending students abroad; and jeopardized Canada's ability to effect change in China on the basis of its "special relationship." It is not at all clear why, having acknowledged "...the benefits of a certain amount of international unison...,"[71] Canada would deviate so far from the more "cautious" visa-extension approach of other western host countries. There are many other unanswered questions. How was it possible and why was it necessary to make such a major policy decision so quickly in June 1989? Given the age, language and cultural gap between most Chinese students in Canada and most Chinese Canadians, why were the latter assigned such a major role in the program? Given the highly emotional state of most Chinese students and scholars in Canada in June 1989, was it advisable to thrust them into a situation in which they had to quickly make a decision with life-long implications? Since most Chinese

students and scholars were concentrated at universities in Canada's major cities, would it not have been less expensive and more efficient to use international student advisers on campus for this purpose? In short, the decision to provide Chinese students in Canada with a limited time offer of permanent residence status in Canada was just too good for most Chinese students to pass up, but it was not a decision which was in Canada's or China's best long-term interests.

Chinese Attitudes Towards Canada

Since June 1989 China's previously friendly relationship with Canada has been dominated by two problems. The first problem has been the unexpectedly vigorous response of the Canadian government to the violence in Tiananmen Square and the subsequent suppression of the student democracy movement. The second problem has been the decision of most Chinese students and scholars in Canada to take advantage of Canada's special post-Tiananmen immigration provisions to opt to remain in Canada as permanent residents. After more than two years of strained relations between China and Canada, it is not yet clear that the "special relationship" which formerly existed between the two countries can easily or quickly be restored.

The Chinese government has insisted that Western nations, Canada included, have misunderstood what happened at Tiananmen, and that in any case it was an internal matter which is not the business of other countries. China at first denied that a "massacre" had

occurred;[72] then described what happened as "large-scale counter-revolutionary chaos" which was supported by "reactionary groups" in Canada, the United States, Hong Kong and Macao;[73] and then argued that the entire affair was "much ado about nothing."[74] It accused the foreign media of "sensationalizing the violence," thus prompting "hypocritical gestures" from western countries.[75] China responded to increasing western criticism of its post-Tiananmen crackdown by warning western countries that "It is unwise and foolish for some foreign countries to try and exert pressure on China through political and economic means."[76] In July the Chinese accused the world's seven leading industrialized countries (the G-7 which includes Canada) of "gross interference" in China's domestic affairs by calling on China "...to cease action against those who have done no more than claim their legitimate rights to democracy and liberty"; and by cutting off high level contact with China and freezing World Bank loans to China.[77] At a subsequent meeting of the G-7 in July 1990, there was considerable pressure from Japan to resume normal relations with China "...in response to recent developments." It was Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and French President Francois Mitterand who insisted on telling the Chinese that "We...believe that the prospects for closer cooperation will be enhanced by renewed political and economic reform, particularly in the field of human rights."[78] While China appeared to welcome Canada's apparently reluctant decision to resume high level contacts at the deputy minister (July 1990) and ministerial (September 1991) levels, it has thus far refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Canada's concern with human rights in China.[79]

It insisted that Canada's special immigration policy for Chinese students was "...an outright encouragement to students not to go home."[80] The response of Chinese authorities has been to refuse to allow officially-sponsored Chinese graduate students (including those funded by international agencies) to come to Canada for graduate degree studies.[81] Even after the special immigration provisions were rescinded by Canada in October 1990, China continued to demand that Canada do much more to ensure the return of Chinese students and scholars.[82]

In the aftermath of Tiananmen, China's approach to the problems of its students and scholars abroad has been three-pronged: "adjusting" its policy of sending students abroad; trying to reach a rapprochement with those students and scholars abroad who had been sympathetic to the pro-democracy movement; and acknowledging the need to improve its treatment of Chinese students and scholars upon their return to China. It appears that thus far these efforts have not been very successful in relation to Chinese students and scholars in Canada.

Within one month of Tiananmen the Chinese government was already reassessing its decade-long policy of sending students abroad.[83] It revealed that between 1978 and 1989 more than 80,000 Chinese stdents and scholars had gone abroad for advanced study and/or research, of whom 60,000 had been government-funded and 20,000 had been self-financed.[84] Premier Li Peng himself confirmed in late summer 1989 China's intention to continue to send its

students abroad in order "...to learn advanced experiences and technologies from foreign nations and to make use of foreign funds and useful management skills."[85] However, it was also made clear that "adjustments" would have to be made to important aspects of the study abroad policy. First, selection of those to be sent abroad would no longer focus merely on professional preparation and foreign language skills, but more and more would emphasize "politically and professionally mature people" and the "needs of the state." Second, the number of graduate students being sent abroad by the Chinese government would be dramatically reduced and graduate training (even at the doctoral level) would be focused "mainly" in Chinese universities, particularly the so-called "key" universities. Third, those Chinese students whose university education had been state-supported, would no longer be allowed to go abroad for graduate study by their own arrangement, no matter what the source of their funding, until after they had had five years of relevant job experience; on the other hand, those graduates whose university education had been completed on a self-supporting basis, would be much less restricted from studying abroad, subject to financing. Fourth, visiting scholars and researchers would be sent abroad in increasing numbers, because they are "older and more mature politically," would typically stay away from China for much shorter periods than graduate students and would be able to achieve academic results more quickly. Finally, students and scholars would no longer be concentrated in a few advanced western countries, but would br distributed to both "developed" and "developing" countries in the "East" and in the "West."[86] In 1990, reflecting these changes,

3,000 Chinese students and scholars were sent abroad, of whom 1,500 were visiting scholars and only 400 were doctoral students.[87] The impact of this decline in the number of Chinese government-supported graduate students has not yet been felt in Canada, apparently in part because of an increase in the number of self-supporting students.[88]

China's leaders have clearly been concerned about the large numbers of Chinese students and scholars who have chosen to remain abroad rather than risk returning home to be harassed or even prosecuted for their pro-democracy political activities in spring and summer 1989. As early as June 19, 1989 a leading Chinese official was of the opinion that the "overwhelming majority" of Chinese students would return home.[89] Another official indicated in July 1989 that the government intended to be "lenient" with students abroad who had "...failed to understand the measures adopted by the government to quell the counter-revolutionary rebellion."[90] In October 1989 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Jiang Zemin himself excused Chinese students abroad who, "...influenced by distorted foreign accounts" had made some mistakes.[91] He reiterated this point more forcefully in June 1990, promising that the Chinese government would "not investigate or hold responsible" Chinese students abroad who had spoken or acted "rashly" in spring/summer 1989. He welcomed students and scholars to return to China to live (assuring them that "appropriate work, study and living arrangements" would be made for them) or even to visit.[92] Even

students who had joined "reactionary organizations" which opposed the Chinese government, were welcome to return as long as they quit the organizations and admitted that they had made mistakes.[93] It appears that in 1990 most Chinese students and scholars in Canada still did not trust Chinese government assurances and were afraid to return to China, even to visit.[94]

China also tried to encourage its students and scholars who were abroad after Tiananmen to come home by promising that they would receive "preferential treatment" upon their return to China. In fact, concerns about the treatment of returned scholars and students predate Tiananmen. Many pre-1989 returnees, particularly younger students as opposed to mid-career scholars, indicated that they had encountered problems in such critical areas as job assignments, salaries, research funding, housing and international travel.[95] It was only beginning in June 1989 however, that some local governments began to move to ensure better treatment and more effective use of returned academics.[96] By fall 1989 the new Ministry of Personnel was indicating that it was assuming overall responsibility for the "management of returned students."[97] More specifically, it announced the creation of a number of "short-term service centres" to deal with the "difficulties the returnees face in their work and daily life," including salaries, academic titles, separation from spouses and access to research monies.[98] Beginning in 1990 the Chinese press began to provide more frequent reports of the positive experiences of returnees,[99] but these reports also revealed the magnitude of the returnee problem. During the seven

months after Tiananmen, for example, about 700 Chinese academics had returned from study or research abroad, of whom only 27 were graduate students and the remainder were all visiting scholars![100] It was presumably for this reason that throughout 1990 there was considerable emphasis on the 32,000 Chinese students and scholars who had returned from abroad since 1978;[101] on the 50,000 who had returned home since 1949;[102] and on the efforts of individual provinces,[103] institutions[104] and ministries[105] to deal with the returnee issue. Despite these efforts, it is clear from a remarkably candid 1991 speech by Hou Xianglin, Vice-Chairman of the CPPCC Science and Technology Committee on "The Brain Drain is Something to be Worried About," that the results have been unsatisfactory. Hou admits that the main difficulty has been that a significant proportion of Chinese academics who have been sent overseas for academic purposes have not returned home because they are not "attracted" to an environment which does not recognize the value of their "talent."[106] In 1990 many returnees were still demoralized by their personal and professional situations and some high priority departments were experiencing serious personnel shortages because of the large number of young professors and graduate students who had delayed their return.[107] Clearly, despite Chinese efforts to improve the treatment of returned students and scholars, the vast majority of Chinese academics in Canada, secure in their permanent resident status, are still not finding the current academic milieu in China to be very attractive.

Canada-China University Linkages After Tiananmen[108]

Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of post-Tiananmen academic relations between China and Canada is the impact that June 1989 events have had on linkages between Chinese and Canadian universities. As indicated earlier, most Canadian universities had some contact with Chinese institutions prior to 1989; some developed extensive ties, including formal linkages; and a few appear to have earmarked links with China, or even with an individual university in China, as an institutional priority. In the wake of Tiananmen most linkage agreements between Chinese and Canadian institutions have either been in a state of flux or in disarray. Few Chinese or Canadian linkage partners appear to have assessed the significance of the changing Canada/China relationship or shifting geopolitical realities for the academic linkages which they signed with such enthusiasm in the late 1970s and 1980s.

The impact of Tiananmen appears to have been greatest on those Chinese universities which had been most enthusiastic about academic exchanges with the West. More conservative elements in some institutions appear to have used the opportunity provided by June 1989 to try to seize the political initiative from those who have been in favor of reform. The anti-government protests of some of their own students abroad and the subsequent decisions of large numbers of their students (including those in Canada) not to return to China, at least at the present time, have been real political liabilities for reform-minded Chinese university

administrators and professors. Mid-career Chinese academics whose education had been disrupted by the Cultural Revolution and who were subsequently allowed to go abroad as visiting scholars, appear to be particularly demoralized by the loss of their best graduate students (and future young teachers and research associates) to colleagues in Canadian partner institutions, who have sometimes seemed too willing to walk away from collaborative teaching and research projects. Canadian alumni who have returned to China frequently feel cut off both from their alma mater and from their former host country. The need to renegotiate CIDA-funded linkages into China-based training programs is regarded as a depressing step backwards by some Chinese professors, particularly those who have been abroad, even though one implication is that they themselves may travel abroad more frequently as visiting scholars. It appears that linkages without IDRC or CIDA funding, or the benefit of provincial twinning arrangements, must also but for the most part have not yet been "adjusted" if they are to become fully functional again.

The Tiananmen incident also appears to have had a tremendous impact on many Canadian universities. It has been characterized as "extremely disruptive," "disappointing" and "terribly powerful, terribly negative and terribly final." In particular, its impact on Canadian professors, whose enthusiastic participation is critical to the academic exchange process, has apparently been devastating; many professors are "turned off China," want to "put China on hold," feel "betrayed and angry" or conclude that "China came and went." Some Canadians who had

formerly been active in exchanges with China have already been distracted by new academic opportunities in Eastern Europe or in other countries of the Pacific Rim. Others began to lose interest in China even before Tiananmen, either because they felt exploited as teachers or frustrated as research collaborators. Some of the largest Canadian universities report the sharpest drop in China interest on campus, reflecting professorial indifference; but also new institutional imperatives such as internationalization, in which China, no longer special, becomes one of many possible international partners. The enthusiasm of some Canadian universities for China-focused CIDA money has faded in light of the need to renegotiate such linkages on a "patchwork" basis and on terms which are much less attractive to Canadian institutions. On the other hand, there is also a small but vocal group of Canadian university administrators and professors who are critical of what they regard as the "political opportunism" of the Canadian government with regard to China; who insist that "moral indignation" cannot be the basis of Canadian foreign policy; and who criticize the "human rights" focus of Canadian policy towards China as a form of Western cultural chauvinism. Finally, there are a number of professors, particularly in western Canada, who argue that Canada's destiny lies in the Pacific Rim region and that, given China's size and potential, Canada should realistically move to resolve conflicts between the two countries as quickly as possible.

There are a few bright spots. Encouraged by the Canadian Embassy

in Beijing, Chinese social scientists have become increasingly interested in Canadian Studies during the past four years; in the aftermath of Tiananmen the number of Canadian Studies centers in China has continued to increase and so has the number of Chinese professors participating in the successful Faculty Enrichment Program. Provincial linkages between Alberta and Heilongjiang and between Ontario and Jiangsu have provided umbrellas under which academic exchanges have been able to continue relatively uninterrupted. For the most part however, it appears that academic relations between Canada and China have lost their momentum and will require a jump start to get moving again.

The Future

In light of the experiences of the past two decades, one could with some justification approach the future of academic relations between China and Canada with trepidation or even anxiety. Given that we cannot change the past but only learn from it, one can also regard the future as an opportunity to redirect the course of academic relations between the two countries. The discussion that follows assumes that the basic building block of academic exchanges between China and Canada is collaboration between professors with similar academic interests; and that institutional linkages (however modified) remain the most effective method for facilitating and sustaining the development of such collaboration.

Institutional linkages have a vital role to play in the further development of academic relations between China and Canada, but existing linkages must first be vetted and in most cases reshaped to suit the new context in which they will have to operate. Although most CIDA-funded linkages have already been revised, linkage partners cannot assume that further funding of the same type will be available to them after their current CCULP, CCMEP or other funding has run out; they should instead begin now to determine whether their twinning arrangements could and should be sustained on a self-sufficiency basis (i.e. without CIDA funding) and if so, plan on further adjustments to their linkages. Linkages without CIDA funding will also have to be vetted sooner or later in light of changed circumstances, after the parties have determined whether their arrangements can and should continue.

The combination of past experience and present circumstances suggests that reshaped institutional linkages between Chinese and Canadian universities should be rooted in seven basic principles:

cooperation: Chinese and Canadian universities should link as equal partners, rather than on an unequal developed country donor/developing country recipient basis;

mutual benefit: they should ensure that their cooperation is of mutual benefit;

focus: they should focus their cooperation on clearly defined areas of institutional strength;

research: they should ensure that the starting point of their cooperation is collaborative research and that any joint teaching that is undertaken is supportive of that research;

commitment: they should identify professors who are committed to collaboration in the selected areas and they should provide those professors with a commitment of institutional support;

continuity: they should ensure continuity of administration of the linkage by designating specific individuals who will be responsible for liaison between their institutions;

review: they should establish regular reviews of their cooperative activities to determine whether their linkages should be extended or terminated on pre-established expiration dates.

Historical circumstances have put CIDA in position to play a critical role in the further development of academic relations between China and Canada. It appears that CCULP should be retained as a CIDA program, but that it should be significantly modified to suit changed circumstances. A possible scenario is that in the next phase of their academic exchange relationship China and Canada could move the focus of Canadian human resource development assistance from individual institutional linkages in order to jointly establish a small number of thematically-focused

joint research and training institutes in areas of mutual interest. These institutes would be located in China and involve specialists drawn from a large number of Chinese and Canadian institutions. Collaborative research could occur in both China and Canada, but joint training of graduate students would occur in China only. This new model, which links multiple Chinese and Canadian universities by specialization rather than by institution, offers many advantages in the current circumstances. It focuses and provides even greater visibility for Canadian development assistance in China. It accomodates a reduction in available Canadian government funding. It facilitates the involvement of a large number of Chinese and Canadian institutions. It compensates for waning Canadian faculty interest in post-Tiananmen post-Cold War China. It deals with increasingly critical awareness on both sides of the relative strengths and weaknesses of individual institutions. It addresses concerns expressed by both sides about non-returning students by continuing to locate graduate training in China and by providing teaching opportunities in China for Chinese students and scholars who have thus far been unwilling to return home. It reduces the proportion of development funds that might otherwise have to be spent on infrastructure costs of participating Canadian universities. It avoids the problem of having to weed through existing linkages by creating a new linkage model in which all institutions may participate.

Three other new initiatives deserve consideration. First, the

creation of a Canadian Alumni Association for Canadian-educated returnees to China has been under discussion for a decade;[109] in light of our experience, such an association and the activities that it might sponsor, appear to be more important than ever. Second, the importance of developing a "corporate memory" for Canada/China academic exchanges has also been under discussion for a decade;[110] a China Liaison Office with a mandate to collect and disseminate information about academic exchanges between the two countries is essential. Third, a Canada/China Research Fellowship program would facilitate the transition from individual linkages to multiple-institution thematic linkages by providing seed money to Chinese and Canadian professors involved in linkages outside the designated theme areas.

The past two decades of academic relations between China and Canada have been anything but dull. There have been moments of exhilaration, moments of tragedy and now an opportunity for new beginnings. The choice presently before Chinese and Canadian universities is not whether to move in new directions, but only in which direction to move.

FOOTNOTES

1. This paper is based in part on two non-traditional sources - interviews and personal observations. During the past decade I have conducted more than 700 interviews with both Chinese and Canadian participants in academic exchanges between the two countries. My two volume 1986 study Canadian Academic Relations with the People's Republic of China Since 1970 (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1986) was based on 602 interviews in Canada with Chinese and Canadian academics between 1982 and 1985; I was subsequently able to conduct additional

interviews in China and in Canada in 1986, 1990 and 1991. I also served as founding Director of Concordia University's Council for International Cooperation (CIC) from 1986 to 1989 and in that capacity developed and administered eight formal linkages with Chinese universities and research institutes.

2. cf. Alvyn J. Austin, Saving China: Canadian Missionaries in the Middle Kingdom, 1888-1959 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).

3. For example, McGill University's academic exchanges with Beijing Medical College which began in 1960, as discussed in Singer, II, p. 43.

4. Ibid., I, pp. 3-4.

5. It is almost impossible to accurately estimate how many Chinese academics have come to Canada for long-term study or research during the past two decades. My earlier study estimated that there had been 1,650 during the period between 1970 and 1983 (Ibid., II, pp. 256-257). Subsequent statistics are confusing because those produced by Employment and Immigration Canada and those produced by Statistics Canada's University Student Information System disagree; another problem is that both sets of recent figures only count who is here and not who has left. See for example Mark Shabaga and Max von Zur-Muehlen, People's Republic of China Students in Canada: A Statistical Documentation for the 1980s (Ottawa: Canadian Federation of Deans of Management and Administrative Studies, 1988), pp. 27, 59-63 and The National Report of International Students in Canada 1989 (Ottawa: Canadian Bureau for International Education, 1989), pp. 52-53.

6. National Report, p. 53.

7. Singer, I, pp. 13-19.

8. Based on my observations while serving as CIC Director and on discussions with many Canadian academics on this question.

9. Based on interviews conducted in China in 1986 and on discussions held in China in 1990.

10. Singer, I, pp. 19-24.

11. These conclusions are based on interviews conducted in China in 1986 and on discussions in China and Canada while I served as CIC Director.

12. This estimate is based on my figure of 609 Canadian faculty visits to China for academic purposes between 1970 and 1983 and takes into account both the proliferation of academic linkages and the availability of CIDA and IDRC financing (Singer, I, p. 30; II, pp. 323-333).

13. Ibid., I, p. 33.

14. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

15. Ibid., pp. 31-35.

16. Based on my observations as CIC Director from 1986 to 1989.

17. Singer, I, pp. 35-36.

18. Based on my observations in Canada and in China while serving as CIC Director.

19. This refers to the academic exchange agreement between Beijing Medical College and McGill University; their exchange began informally in 1960 and was apparently formalized in the early 1970s (Singer, II, p. 143).

20. Singer, II, pp. 373-375.

21. "Canadian Development Cooperation in Asia: China" (Hull, Quebec: CIDA, 1991).

22. Based on an analysis of many pre-1986 Canada/China linkage agreements which I undertook at the beginning of my mandate as CIC Director.

23. These observations are based on comments made to me by Chinese university administrators and professors both in Canada and in China between 1986 and 1991.

24. IDO Newsletter, no. 1, 1978.

25. This was the experience of both the University of British Columbia and Universite de Montreal in the conclusion of linkages with Beijing University (Singer, II, pp. 93-94, 160).

26. This was the experience of both the University of British Columbia and Dalhousie University in their linkages with Zhongshan University and the Law Faculty of Beijing University respectively (Singer, II, pp. 95-96, 113).

27. Ibid., I, pp. 65-66; II, p. 75.

28. "Canadian Universities and China," (Ottawa: Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, 1982).

29. These observations are based on numerous discussions which I have had with Canadian university administrators and professors during the past decade, as well as on my experience as CIC Director.

30. "Canadian Development Cooperation," p. 7 (unnumbered).

31. Quoted in Singer, I, p. 59.

32. "Canadian Development Cooperation," p. 6 (unnumbered).

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 7 (unnumbered).

35. Singer, I, pp. 53-55; "Canadian Development Cooperation," p. 7 (unnumbered).

36. Singer, I, p. 53 and interviews at CIDA, October 1991.

37. "Canadian Development Cooperation," p. 6 (unnumbered).

38. Ibid., pp. 8-11 (unnumbered).

39. These observations are based primarily on my own experiences as CIC director.

40. Quotations taken from interviews in October 1991 with Canadian university administrators and professors.

41. See for example "Overseas Chinese march in support of student protest," The Gazette, May 21, 1989, p. B1; "Local students demonstrate at U of C," May 21, 1989, pp. A1-A2; "Don't use guns against students, Chinese Canadians tell Beijing," The Globe and Mail, May 22, 1989, p. A3; "Metro rally backs Beijing protesters," The Toronto Star, May 29, 1989, p. A4; "3,000 turn out for rally at City Hall in support of protests in Beijing," The Globe and Mail, May 29, 1989, p. A8; and "2,000 rally in Vancouver to back protesters," May 29, 1981, p. B1.

42. See for example "Emotional crowd of 30,000 marches on consulate," The Globe and Mail, June 5, 1989, p. A9; "Chinese Canadians mourn dead, plan protests," The Globe and Mail, June 6, 1989, p. A14; and "Marchers denounce China massacre," The Gazette, June 8, 1989, p. A3.

43. See for example "Chinese students make emotional calls home," The Gazette, June 6, 1989, p. A3; and "Relatives being harassed for protests, students say," The Globe and Mail, June 13, 1989, p. A4.

44. See for example "Canadian students flown out after night of fear," The Gazette, June 7, 1989, p. A1; "Seneca College students involved in confrontation with soldiers," The Toronto Star, June 7, 1989, p. A20; "Canadians tell of carnage in China," The Toronto Star, June 8, 1989, pp. A1, A36.

45. "Canada demands end to 'senseless killing,'" The Globe and Mail, June 5, 1989, p. A10.

46. "Canadians urged by Clark to leave Beijing immediately," The Gazette June 6, 1989, p. A2.

47. "Canada to review links with China after slaughter by army troops," The Toronto Star, June 7, 1989, p. A19.

48. "'Don't despair,' Mulroney tells young Chinese," The Toronto Star, June 9, 1989, p. A1.

49. "Canada calls home China envoy," The Toronto Star, June 13, 1989, p. A4; and "Clark pledges help to fearful Chinese," The Toronto Star, June 17, 1989, p. A12.

50. "Clark calling in Chinese ambassador to protest repression," The Toronto Star, June 15, 1989, p. A23.

51. "China and Canada: The Months Ahead," Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, June 30, 1989, p. 15.

52. Claude Lajeunesse, Executive Director, Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, letter to University Executive Heads, June 21, 1989, pp. 1-3.

53. Micheline Beaudry-Somcynsky, Acting Country Program Director, China Program, CIDA, letter to CEAs, July 5, 1989.

54. V. J. Nordin, Senior Coordinator, CCULP, International Division, AUCC, letter to Directors, CCULP Linkage Projects and ICDS Projects, ILOs, June 17, 1989 and attached "File Report," pp. 1-8.

55. "CCULP Annual Report 1989/90," (Ottawa: International Division, AUCC, 1990).

56. "CCULP Annual Report 1990/91," (Ottawa: International Division, AUCC, 1991).

57. Elizabeth McAllister, Country Program Director, China Desk, CIDA, undated letter to all Canadian Project Directors, CCULP, ICDS, Bilateral and ILOs in CCULP universities, circulated by AUCC.

58. Interviews at CIDA, October 11, 1991 and October 16, 1991.

59. "Chinese Student Secretariat/National Emergency Support for Chinese Students Programme Final Narrative Report to CIDA," 2 volumes, Canadian Bureau for International Education, March 1990, I, p. 6.

60. "Canadians urged by Clark to leave Beijing immediately," The Gazette, June 6, 1989, p. A2.

61. "Chinese Student Secretariat," I, p. 5.

62. News release, Minister of Employment and Immigration, June 16, 1989, pp. 1-4; and "Joe Clark pledges help to fearful Chinese," The Toronto Star, June 17, 1989, p. A12.

63. Claude Lajeunesse, June 21, 1989, pp. 1-3; see also "Chinese Student Secretariat," I, pp. 5-6.

64. "Chinese Student Secretariat," I, p. 5.

65. Ibid., pp. 6, 8-9.

66. "Much of Chinese students' fund being used to set up program," The Toronto Star, July 15, 1989, p. A3; and Monique Landry, "Letter to the Editor: Aid for Chinese students," The Globe and Mail, August 14, 1989, p. A6.

67. "Chinese Student Secretariat," I, pp. 9-29.

68. Ibid., II, "Charts and Tables," pp. 32-33.

69. Ibid., I, p. 46.

70. Ibid.

71. "China and Canada," p. 3.

72. "Government denies any massacre," The Gazette, June 7, 1989, p. A12.

73. "Groups in Canada and U.S. helped plot 'chaos,' China charges," The Globe and Mail, June 21, 1989, p. A9.

74. "Jiang Zemin: 'Incident' 'Much Ado About Nothing,'" Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), June 6, 1990, p. 7.

75. "Commentator Views Overseas Students Policy," FBIS, July 31, 1989, p. 29.

76. "Mind own business, West told as China executes seven," The Globe and Mail, June 23, 1989, p. A12.

77. "China Accuses G-7 of 'gross interference,'" The Globe and Mail, July 18, 1989, p. A14.

78. "Richest nations agree to allow aid for China," The Toronto Star, July 11, 1990, pp. A1, A4.

79. "Canada urges China to end repression," The Toronto Star, July 20, 1990, p. A14.

80. "Don't let students stay in Canada, Chinese envoy warns Ottawa," The Globe and Mail, June 8, 1990, p. A15.

81. Discussed in meetings at both the Canadian Embassy and the State Education Commission in Beijing, August 1990.

82. Discussed in meeting at the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, October 11, 1991.

83. "PRC To Adjust Policy on Sending Students Abroad," FBIS, July 3, 1989, p. 43.

84. "Students Dispatched to 76 Countries, Regions," FBIS, September 22, 1989, p. 2.

85. "Li Peng on Policy of Students Studying Abroad," FBIS, September 28, 1989, p. 29.

86. Ibid., pp. 29-30; and "Improved Policy on Sending Students Abroad Urged," FBIS, September 5, 1989, pp. 32-33.

87. "Government Scholarships for 3,000 to Study Abroad," FBIS, April 12, 1990, pp. 40-41.

88. This conclusion is based on my October 1991 interviews with administrators and professors from universities across Canada and from statistics provided by both the Department of External Affairs and the Canadian Bureau for International Education.

89. "Interview with Tom Brokaw," FBIS, June 19, 1989, p. 5.

90. "Reporters Question Official on Students Abroad," FBIS, July 28, 1989, p. 23.

91. "Jiang Zemin Addresses Returning Students," FBIS, March 14, 1990, p. 18.

92. "Students Abroad Connected With Turmoil Pardoned," FBIS, June 15, 1990, p. 8.

93. "Li Tieying Says Students Abroad Free To Come, Go," FBIS, October 1, 1990, p. 34.

94. "Students in Toronto unmoved by China's bid to woo them home," The Globe and Mail, January 22, 1990, p. A5; and "Students in Canada rebuff Beijing's offer," The Globe and Mail, June 2, 1990, p. D3.

95. These observations are based on numerous interviews and discussions with Canadian-trained returnees in China between 1986 and 1989.

96. "Shanghai Issues New Policies on Returned Students," FBIS, June 23, 1989, p. 18; "Shanghai Issues Regulations on Returning Students," FBIS, June 27, 1989, p. 59; and "Guangdong's Shenzhen Regulates Returning Students," FBIS, August 16, 1989, pp. 47-48.

97. "Returned Students To Receive More Guidance," FBIS, October 4, 1989, p. 14.

98. "Conditions for Returning Students To Improve," FBIS, November 3, 1989, pp. 31-32.

99. See for example "Report Views Contribution of Returned

Experts," FBIS, December 8, 1989, pp. 17-18; "Xinhua Interviews Returned Students," FBIS, December 11, 1989, pp. 14-15; and "Shanghai Welcomes Student Returning from U.S.," FBIS, December 13, 1989, p. 14.

100. "700 Returning Students 'Warmly Welcomed,'" FBIS, January 12, 1990, pp. 8-9.

101. See for example "Ministry Reports on Service of Returned Students," FBIS, September 25, 1990, p. 24.

102. See for example "Achievements Praised," FBIS, November 20, 1990, p. 18.

103. See for example "Shanxi Assists Returned Students' Research," FBIS, March 28, 1990, p. 35.

104. See for example "Xian Teachers, Students Return from Overseas," FBIS, September 10, 1990, p. 54; and "Universities Assist Returning Students," FBIS, May 17, 1991, pp. 34-35.

105. See for example "Public Health Minister on Returned Student Care," FBIS, November 29, 1990, p. 23.

106. "Hou Xianglin Stresses Brain Drain Problem," FBIS, April 5, 1991, pp. 23-25; and "Hou Xianglin Calls for Brain Drain Solution," FBIS, April 1, 1991, p. 30.

107. Observations based on discussions in China in August 1990 and intervies in Canada in October 1991.

108. Ibid.

109. Singer, I, p. 29.

110. Ibid., p. 24.